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COMMENT
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMERS' IDENTITIES
By STEPHEN E. NEWTON*
THE use of confidential informers by the police is becoming an in-
creasingly important law enforcement technique. The informer may
be an undercover agent,' a criminal, who may or may not have been
given immunity for his information, 2 or simply a citizen who has be-
come aware of the commission of a crime and volunteers information
to the police.' His role may be hazardous, and if the police are re-
quired to reveal his identity in order to justify an arrest or search
made on the basis of information received from him, the danger is
greatly increased.4
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
prohibits unreasonable search and seizure and provides that no war-
rant shall issue without probable cause.5 In order to discourage con-
tinuing abuses of this amendment, the Supreme Court, in 1914,
adopted the "exclusionary rule." Initially it provided that evidence
obtained by an illegal search and seizure by a federal officer was not
admissible in a criminal proceeding in a federal court.7 The United
States Supreme Court has since decided, in Mapp v. Ohio,8 that the
exclusionary rule is binding upon the states in order to assure that
the fourth amendment safeguards will not be violated by state offi-
cers.
9
* Member, Second Year Class.
'People v. Wilburn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 702, 16 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961) cert. denied,
369 U.S. 856 (1962).
2Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
3 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
4 People v. Durazo, 52 Cal. 2d 354, 358-59, 340 P.2d 594, 597 (1959) (dissenting
opinion).
5 The California constitution contains essentially the same provision. CAL. CONST.
art 1, § 19.
6 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7 The exclusionary rule was adopted by the Supreme Court of California in 1955.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905. At that time the rule was discretionary
with the individual states. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8367 U.S. 643 (1961). The scope of the rule had previously been expanded by
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (evidence illegally seized by federal officers
not admissible in state courts), and by Eldns v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)
(evidence seized illegally by state officers not admissible in federal courts).
9 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), though holding a particular arrest con-
stitutional, reiterated that each state must follow the exclusionary rule.
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The legality of the search may depend upon whether probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant existed,' 0 or, in the ab-
sence of a warrant, whether the search was incident to a legal arrest."
The legality of the arrest, in turn, depends upon the existence of
probable cause before the arrest, to believe that the arrestee is guilty
of the crime for which he was arrested. 2
The purpose of this note is to explore the right of the state to use
the communications of an informer to establish this probable cause
if it claims a privilege to refuse to disclose his identity. The law of
California, including the extent to which it is subject to federal rules,
will be emphasized.
PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON HEARSAY
Before a discussion of the problem of disclosure of identity will
be meaningful, the basic elements of probable cause must be under-
stood.'8 Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances would
warrant a reasonable man's belief that an offense had been committed
by the accused.' 4 It has been firmly established that hearsay'5 may
constitute probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.'8
Draper v. United States'7 established that an arrest without a
warrant may be legally based on a communication from an informer
10 FE . CR m. P. 41(c).
'1Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
12FED. R. Camn. P. 3, 4. 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (1964) makes the same provisions for
arrest by federal narcotics agents.
18 A general discussion of probable cause is beyond the scope of this note. See
generally Draper, The Cahan Case and Probable Cause, 34 CAL. S.B.J. 251 (1959).
'4 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). "Evidence which would 'warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a felony has been committed" is sufficient
to establish probable cause. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
Whether probable cause exists is a factual determination depending on the particular
circumstances of the case. United States v. Williams, 336 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1964);
United States v. Wai Lau, 329 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1964).
15 The term "hearsay" as used in this note refers to information relied upon in part
as probable cause, which would be hearsay evidence if offered at the trial by the one
relying on it.
IsJones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The affidavit stated that an un-
named infor~aer had told the afflant that the defendant was engaged in illicit narcotics
traffic, and had sold narcotics to the informer. The affiant further swore that the informer
had previously given correct information. The Court distinguishes Jones from Nathanson
v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), which held that an affidavit did not establish
probable cause where it merely set out the belief of someone other than the afflant. In
Jones the facts set forth in the affidavit were the personal observations of the informer,
not merely his belief.
In discussing warrants, the cases make no substantial distinction between search
warrants and warrants for arrest
'7 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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to an arresting officer,18 but that alone is not sufficient to establish
probable cause (for the issuance of a warrant or an arrest without
one) in the absence of a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. 9
There must be facts within the officer's knowledge which corroborate
the informer's story,20 or the informer must have proven himself re-
liable in the past.21 In both Draper and Jones v. United States22 the
informer was considered reliable because he had given correct in-
formation in the past, but the requirements of reliability were not
thoroughly discussed by the Court because there were also corroborat-
ing facts in both cases. The corroborating circumstances need not,
in themselves, be indicative of guilt, provided that when taken to-
gether with the information given to the officer, a reasonable man
would be led to believe that the accused was guilty.28 The more
reliable the informer, the less is needed to corroborate his story.24
Conversely, if the informer is anonymous,25 or of unknown reliability,
more corroborating evidence is required.26
The cases in which the exclusionary rule may be most devastat-
ing to the prosecution are crimes of possession. Narcotics violations
are the primary examples, 27 but some of the others are possession
is Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932), has been cited as authority for the
position that the evidence necessary to show probable cause must be admissible at the
trial. But, in Grau, although the evidence was in fact competent, it was insufficient to
establish probable cause. The Supreme Court has not repeated the statement that the
evidence must be competent before a jury, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
174 n.13 (1949), although such a rule has been applied by some of the circuit courts
of appeals. E.g., Simmons v. United States, 18 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1927); Worthington
v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948).
19 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960).
20 Bek v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); United States v. Elgisser, 334 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 l Wrightson v. United States, 236 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Hurst v. California,
211 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Cal. 1962); United States v. Jackson, 159 F. Supp..845 (D.D.C.
1958).
22362 U.S. 257 (1960).
28Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). Draper arrived on a certain
train, as predicted by the informer, was dressed according to the description, and walked
quickly, carrying a tan zipper bag. Accord, United States v. Luster, 342 F.2d 763
(6th Cir. 1965); Thompson v. United States, 342 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1965); Newcomb
v. United States, 327 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Robinson, 325 F.2d
391 (2d Cir. 1963).
24 See cases cited note 23 supra.
25 As in Hurst v. California, 211 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
26Newcomb v. United States, 327 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Irby, 304 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1962); Overton v. United States, 275 F.2d 897 (D.C. Cir.
1960); United States v. Valentine, 202 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
2 7 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
28 Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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of "boot-leg" alcohol,28 stolen property and counterfeit money °0
Generally the evidence obtained by the search is conclusive proof
of guilt,8 if admissible, and the only defense presented is that there
was no probable cause for the search, or for the arrest to which the
search was incident. Often the evidence which the defendant con-
tends is inadmissible is the only evidence which the prosecution has.
In seeking to show lack of probable cause for an arrest or search,
the defendant often demands that the identity of the informer be
revealed. It was decided in Roviaro v. United States32 that the in-
former's identity must be disclosed when he is a participant and
material witness.8" There is support for this position in California.34
These cases are to be distinguished from those in which the informer
plays no part in the crime, but merely directs the attention of the
police toward the defendant. The latter are the primary concern of
this note.
Arguments Against Disclosure
There are ample reasons for the prosecution's desire to keep the
identity of its informer a secret. In his dissenting opinion in People
v. Durazo,35 a narcotics case, Justice Shenk stated:
By the very nature of the crime the use of informers plays a major
role in the apprehension of narcotic violators . . . .Obviously it
becomes impossible to solicit the assistance of informers where their
identity is required to be revealed and they are thus exposed to re-
taliation on the part of narcotic violators. The hazardous position
of the informer is dramatically called to our attention in [citing
case]. ... where it was held that inadequate protection had been
furnished to an informer who was set upon and murdered.... It
is apparent that the need to protect the informer's name, and his
life as well, is a factor to be given considerable weight in the balance
29 Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
30 Newcomb v. United States, 327 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1964).
3 l E.g., "[E]very person who possesses any narcotic [except by prescription] ...
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison...." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11500.
32353 U.S. 53 (1957).
33 The informer had purchased narcotics from the defendant. The Court ruled that
the informer was the only material witness to the charge of selling narcotics and to the
charge of illegally transporting them. The Court did not discuss how it might have
ruled had there been more than one material witness, although it did emphasize that
the informer was the "sole participant other than the accused .... [t]he only witness
in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of the government witnesses."
Id. at 64.
34 People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal. 2d 748, 3 Cal. Rptr. 1, 349 P.2d 673 (1960); People
v. Williams, 51 Cal. 2d 355, 333 P.2d 19 (1958); People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802,
330 P.2d 33 (1958).
85 52 Cal. 2d 354, 340 P.2d 594 (1959).
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in determining whether the state must reveal the source of its in-
formation. 6
Another reason for official reluctance to reveal the names of informers
is that disclosure would destroy their future efficacy, just when they
had proven themselves reliable.
Arguments for Disclosure
Although the reasons for nondisclosure are strong, they are not
absolute. The public interest in nondisclosure must be balanced
against the right of the defendant adequately to prepare his defense.3 7
The United States Supreme Court has said that fixed rules for determin-
ing when disclosure must be made are not appropriate, but that the
determination depends upon the particular circumstances of the
case at bar.3 8
One argument advanced for requiring disclosure is that the issue
of probable cause should be determined by an impartial judge or
magistrate, but unless the judge or magistrate hears the testimony
and cross-examination of the informer, he cannot make the deter-
mination. Instead, the reliability of the informer, and the existence
of probable cause, will be determined by the arresting officer.39
Another closely related argument is that, by cross-examining the in-
former, the defendant may be able to cast doubt on the informer's
reliability, or show that the officer lied about the information that
he had at the time of the arrest.40
PRESENT LAW OF DISCLOSURE
Warrant Cases
The leading federal case on the issue of disclosure when a valid
warrant has been issued on the basis of information from informers
36 Id. at 358-59, 340 P.2d at 597. "It is common knowledge that without the aid
of confidential informants the discovery and prevention of crime would present such a
formidable task as practically to render hopeless the efforts of those charged with law
enforcement. And the alarming fact that the underworld often wreaks vengeance upon
informers would unquestionably deter the giving of such information if the identity of
the informer should be required to be disclosed in all instances." Harrington v. State,
110 So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla. App. 1959).
37 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); United States v. Robinson, 325
F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1963); People v. Williams, 51 Cal. 2d 355, 333 P.2d 19 (1958);
Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 391 (1958).38 R oviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
39 United States v. Robinson, 325 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1963); United States ex rel.
Coffey v. Fay, 234 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.
2d 812, 818, 330 P.2d 39, 43 (1958).40 R oviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). See also cases cited note 39 supra.
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is Rugendorf v. United States.41 Three informers, not material wit-
nesses, told stories to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
which together constituted probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant. The information was that a considerable number of
furs, which matched the description of furs stolen earlier in another
state, had been seen in the defendant's basement. Two men who,
according to one of the informers, had stolen the furs had been
seen at the market owned by the defendant's brother, who allegedly
was a fence for stolen furs. An F.B.I. agent obtained a warrant on an
affidavit which contained the above information, but did not disclose
the names of the informers. In spite of the trial court's refusal of
the defendant's demand for disclosure of the informers' identities,
the conviction was affirmed. The Court ruled that it was not neces-
sary to disclose the identities of the informers since the United States
commissioner who issued -the warrant had a substantial basis for
crediting the facts recited in the affidavit.42 The only challenge to
the sufficiency of the affidavit was that two small facts were inac-
curate. These facts, however, were held to be irrelevant and imma-
terial to the issue.43 Rugendorf governs the situation in federal cases,
where a warrant has been issued.44
41376 U.S. 528 (1964).
42 Id. at 533.
43 The two inaccuracies were: the defendant and his brother were associated in
business; and the defendant was the manager of his brother's market. The Court said
that since they were the allegations of one of the informers, and not of the F.B.I. agent,
they did not cast doubt on the good faith and veracity of the agent. The court did
not meet the issue of whether the inaccuracies could be used to cast doubt on the
credibility of the other allegations of the informer. The defendant attempted to bring
the case within the Roviaro rule by saying that only the informer could provide in-
formation as to whether he had been a participant in receiving the goods, and there-
fore was a material witness. Although that claim had not been raised at the trial, and
thus could not be raised on appeal, the Court said that even if it had been properly
raised, it would have been denied. There was no intimation that the informer was a
participant, and the defendant had completely failed to show how the informer's
identity would be helpful to a defense on the merits.
44 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) should not be construed as requiring
disclosure. The. affidavit in that case stated that, "Afflants have received reliable in-
formation from a credible person and do believe that heroin . . . and narcotic para-
phernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purposes of sale and
use contrary to the provisions of the law." Id. at 109. In holding that the affidavit did
not show probable cause, the Court said that the affidavit not only failed to show any
personal knowledge on the part of the afflant, but it also failed to show whether the
informer had any personal knowledge. In merely stating that the afflants believed that
the defendant had narcotics, the affidavit stated no facts supporting that belief, nor any
information actually received from the informer. Thus the magistrate could not possibly
judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied upon to establish probable
cause. Id. at 114. Citing Jones and Rugendorf, the Court explicitly states that the
informer's identity "need not be disclosed." Ibid.
[Vol. 17
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The California rule is similar to that of Rugendorf. People v.
Keener'5 held that the prosecution need not disclose the identity of
its informer where the search was made pursuant to a warrant, valid
on its face, as long as the magistrate was satisfied from the evidence
that probable cause existed.46
No-Warrant Cases
The issue of disclosure when the arrest is made without a warrant
has not been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The decisions of the lower federal courts are in conflict.47
The rule in California is set out in Priestly v. Superior Court.4" In
an opinion by Justice Traynor, the court ruled that if the informa-
tion given to the police by the informer is necessary to establish
probable cause for the arrest without a warrant, the identity of the
informer must be revealed in order to allow the defendant a fair op-
portunity to rebut the officer's testimony on the issue of probable
cause.49 The defendant made a prima facie case of lack of probable
cause by showing that his arrest was without a warrant.5 The burden
of proof was then on the prosecution to show that probable cause
existed. The procedural effect of the rule is to require the testimony
of the officer with respect to information received from the informer
to be stricken upon proper motion by the defense, if the prosecution
refuses to disclose the identity of the informer.,1 (The court seems to
assume that the prosecution knows the identity of the informer and
makes the actual decision on disclosure.) The court explicitly disap-
proved any previous holdings not requiring disclosure.52
Priestly does not conflict with the provision in California Code
of Civil Procedure section 1881(5) that "a public officer cannot be
examined as to communications made to him in official confidence
when the public interest would suffer by the disclosure." The prosecu-
tion retains the choice of disclosing the informer's identity, or claim-
ing the privilege and having the testimony stricken.58 In Coy v.
45 55 Cal. 2d 714, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587 (1961).
46 The affidavit set out the information received from the confidential informer,
and also stated, as evidence of the informer's reliability, that as a result of information
received from him in the past, four persons were arrested and held to answer at pre-
liminary hearings.
47 Newcomb v. United States, 327 F.2d 649 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
944 (1964) (disclosure not required); United States v. Robinson, 325 F.2d 391 (2d
Cir. 1963) (disclosure required).
4850 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
49 Id. at 818, 330 P.2d at 43.
50 Id. at 816, 330 P.2d at 41.
51 Id. at 819, 330 P.2d at 43.
52 Ibid.
58 Id. at 818-19, 330 P.2d at 43. In Priestly, disclosure was demanded at the pre-
liminary hearing. The result of striking the officer's testimony would be a failure to
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Superior Court,54 the defendant asked for disclosure, the prosecution
objected, and the objection was sustained on the ground that the in-
former's identity was privileged. On appeal, the defendant contended
that it was error to sustain the objection. The court held that there
was no error. Disclosure is not mandatory. The defendant's remedy
is to move to have the testimony regarding the informer's information
stricken. But the defendant must make the motion, because the pros-
ecution may be willing to disclose if its case would otherwise fail, or
it may have other evidence to introduce if the testimony regarding
the informer is stricken.55
A number of cases subsequent to Priestly have limited the effect
of the disclosure requirement, resulting in the anomalous situation
that, although disclosure is required so that the defendant can cross-
examine the informer,56 he may never have the opportunity to do
so. In People v. Prewitt,57 a non-warrant case, the officer received
an anonymous phone call from an informer, but he recognized his
voice as one who had, on two previous occasions, given information
leading to arrests. The order of the superior court setting aside the
indictment was reversed, the Supreme Court holding that probable
cause had been established, even though the informer could not
be identified. Proven accuracy in the past justified reliance on the
informer in this case. Thus the court held that the identity of the
informer was not essential to a fair trial, although the indictment
would have been set aside had the informer's identity been withheld
from the defendant but known to the police.
Even if disclosure is made as required by Priestly, the informer's
whereabouts may not be known or he may have purposely disap-
peared, and thus still not be available as a witness. However, his
failure to appear does not require that the testimony of the officer
regarding communications from the informer be stricken.59 The
show probable cause for the arrest and search. Under the exclusionary rule, the evidence
obtained by the search-narcotics-would be repressed, and there would be no evidence
to warrant holding the defendant for trial.
54 51 Cal. 2d 471, 334 P.2d 569 (1959).
55Accord, People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1963).
56 Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 818, 330 P.2d 39, 43 (1958).
1552 Cal. 2d 330, 341 P.2d 1 (1959).
58Id. at 337, 341 P.2d at 5. The case was distinguished from Priestly on the theory
that if the officer did not know who the informer was, it was impossible for him to
disclose. It was not a case of claiming the privilege of nondisclosure which, under
Priestly, would have required that the officer's testimony be stricken. Id. at 336, 341
P.2d at 4.
59 People v. Galvan, 208 Cal. App. 2d 443, 25 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1962); People v.
Sauceda, 199 Cal. App. 2d 47, 18 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1962); People v. Castedy, 194 Cal.
App. 2d 763, 15 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1961); People v. McKoy, 193 Cal. App. 2d 104, 13
Cal. Rptr. 809 (1961); People v. Givens, 191 Cal. App. 2d 834, 13 Cal. Rptr. 261
(1961). Although the police are not required to keep track of the informer so as to
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rule, then, while requiring disclosure, contains no assurance that its
raison d'etre will be fulfilled.
EFFECT OF THE EVIDENCE CODE ON DISCLOSURE
The recently enacted California Evidence Code contains provi-
sions dealing directly with the disclosure of official information and
the identity of an informer. The code, which becomes effective Jan-
uary 1, 1967, repeals California Code of Civil Procedure section 1881,11
which is replaced in part by sections 1040 and 1041 of the Evidence
Code. Particularly relevant to this discussion is Evidence Code sec-
tion 1042. Subdivision (a) thereof provides that if the privilege of
nondisclosure is claimed by the state or a public entity in a criminal
proceeding where the privileged information (not limited to, but
including, informers) is material to the issue, the court will make
such order or finding of fact adverse to the prosecution, on that issue,
as is required by law. However, section 1042(b) provides that re-
gardless of subdivision (a), disclosure is not required when a war-
rant, valid on its face, has been issued. So far as the question of the
informer's identity is concerned, section 1042(b) is a codification of
the present California law concerning warrants, as set out by the
Keener rule.61
The provision of the Evidence Code which may have the greatest
impact on existing law is section 1042(c):
Notwithstanding subdivision (a), in any preliminary hearing, crim-
inal trial, or other criminal proceeding, for violation of any pro-
vision of Division 10 (commencing with section 11000) of the
Health and Safety Code [narcotics violations], the evidence of in-
formation communicated to a peace officer by a confidential in-
formant, who is not a material witness to the guilt or innocence
of the accused of the offense charged, shall be admissible on the
issue of reasonable cause to make an arrest or search without re-
quiring that the name or identity of the informant be disclosed if
the judge or magistrate is satisfied, based upon evidence produced
in open court, out of the presence of the jury, that such information
be able to produce him as a witness, they may not encourage -him to disappear, or
otherwise prevent his appearance. People v. Wilbum, 195 Cal. App. 2d 702, 16 CaL.
Rptr. 97 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 856 (1962).
60 Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, § 64. CAL.. CODE rv. PNoc. § 1881, the section to be
repealed, enumerates and defines privileged communications.
6155 Cal. 2d 714, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587 (1961). "Subdivision (b)
does not affect the rule that a defendant is entitled to know the identity of an in-
former in a case where the informer is a material witness with respect to facts directly
relating to the defendant's guilt." Comment-Assembly Committee on Judiciary, WEST'S
CA_.romn EVmENCE CODE 220 (1965).
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was received from a reliable informant and in his discretion does
not require such disclosure.62
The effect of the above provision is the abolishment by the legis-
lature, in narcotics cases, of the rule laid down in Priestly that the
identity of an informer must be disclosed in all cases of arrest without
a warrant's-where the prosecution relies-on the facts supplied by the
informer to establish probable cause. 4 Section 1042(c) of the Evi-
dence Code allows communications from an undisclosed informer
to be used to establish probable cause, provided that: (1) the in-
former is not a material witness to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant; 5 (2) the judge or magistrate is satisfied that the informer
was reliable; and (3) the judge or magistrate is satisfied that the
officer received the information.
The requirement that the informer be reliable in cases where the
arrest is made without a warrant is no different from that obtaining
in those cases in which a warrant has been issued. In People v.
Keener,0 a case involving a warrant, the magistrate was satisfied as
to the informer's reliability because the informer had previously given
correct information leading to four arrests. Similarly, in the Prewitt
case, where there was no warrant, the prosecution was able to es-
tablish the informer's reliability even though his identity was un-
known. Thus the California Supreme Court has already established
that the requirement of reliability may be met without disclosure.
The arresting officer would be cross-examined on the issue of re-
62 Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 937, adds § 1881.1 to the Code of Civil Procedure. This
section will be in effect until the Evidence Code becomes effective (Jan. 1, 1967) and
will then be repealed. It is identical to CAL. EvmEcE CoDE: § 1042(c), quoted in the
text.
83Cf. People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d 714, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587 (1961).
64Cases in which there is sufficient evidence, apart from the informer's testimony,
to establish probable cause do not require disclosure even though it may have been
the informer who originally caused the police to suspect the defendant. People v.
Fuqua, 222 Cal. App. 2d 306, 35 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1963); People v. Oritz, 208 Cal. App.
2d 572, 25 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1962); People v. Rodriguez, 204 Cal. App. 2d 427, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 324 (1962); People v. Womack, 200 Cal. App. 2d 634, 19 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1962).
Note that such a result is contemplated in Priestly. "Such a requirement [disclosure]
does not unreasonably discourage the free flow of information to law enforcement
officers or otherwise impede law enforcement. Actually its effect is to compel independ-
ent investigations to verify information given by an informer or to uncover other facts
that establish reasonable cause to make an arrest or search. Such a practice would
ordinarily make it unnecessary to rely on the communications from the informer to
establish probable cause." 50 Cal. 2d 812, 818, 330 P.2d 39, 43 (1958).
05 This requirement has already been' treated with respect to both federal and
California cases. Cases cited notes 32 and 34 supra.
06 55 Cal. 2d 714, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587 (1961).
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liability, to the extent that his testimony would not result in dis-
closure.67
The additional requirement that the judge or magistrate be satis-
fied that the officer actually received the information, and that the
informer was not invented in order to justify a completed arrest or
search, is also within the scope of the decided cases. In answer to
the contention that fictitious informers might be relied upon, the
court in Prewitt said: "It cannot be presumed, however, that officers
will commit perjury ...and it must be presumed that trial courts
will be alert to detect perjury if it does occur."6 8
In analyzing the effect of the Evidence Code on the law of dis-
closure, it is appropriate to give attention to the arguments advanced
in favor of disclosure which were more fully set out above. One
argument is that if the prosecution is not required to disclose the
informer's identity, the issue of probable cause will be determined
by the arresting officer instead of a judge or magistrate."9 The fallacy
here is apparent. It is true that if the officer merely stated that the in-
former was reliable and that his communication gave rise to probable
cause, then he alone would determine the issue. But if the officer
testifies, as required by Evidence Code section 1042(c), to the facts
communicated to him by the informer and the circumstances which
establish the informer's reliability, all of the evidence related to the
issue of probable cause will be in the hands of the judge or magis-
trate. The judge will make the determination of probable cause based
on those facts, not on the officer's conclusions. The only question that
would be left in doubt is the veracity of the officer in stating the
facts. But the officer's veracity may be explored in his testimony and
cross-examination, as in the case with any other witness. 70
67 The question of reliability has not been thoroughly treated in the federal cases,
and apparently the requirement is met by a conclusional statement that the informer
is believed to be reliable on the basis of accurate information given in the past. See
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S
528 (1964).
68 52 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 341 P.2d 1, 5. Accord, People v. Farrara, 46 Cal. 2d 265,
294 P.2d 21 (1956).
69 See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
7 0 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1963(15) establishes a disputable statutory presumption
that the official duty has been regularly performed. This section is superseded by
CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 664, which contains the same provision, but with this excep-
tion: "This presumption does not apply on an issue as to the lawfulness of an arrest
... made without a warrant." There is already a presumption on this point in California.
People v. Agnew, 16 Cal. 2d 655, 107 P.2d 601 (1940). The presumption is that an
arrest without a warrant is illegal, and the burden is on the person making the arrest to
show that it was legal. This presumption was recognized in Priestly. However, there is
no presumption that the officer is lying when he attempts to justify the arrest. Subse-
quent to Agnew and Priestly, the California Supreme Court specifically emphasized in
October, 1965] COMMENT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
As to the argument that disclosure is necessary to give the de-
fendant an opportunity to rebut the testimony of the officer on prob-
able cause by examining the informer, it has already been pointed
out that the fact that the informer is not available to testify does not
require striking the testimony on probable cause.71
CONCLUSION
The rule in Priestly requiring the prosecution to disclose the
identity of an informer, in the case of an arrest made without a war-
rant, is in direct conflict with section 1042(c) of the California Evi-
dence Code. However, from the preceding arguments, it can be
seen that to a large extent, the purpose of the disclosure rule has
been lost so that the defendant may never be able to examine the
informer.72 Since probable cause may be established even if the in-
former cannot be found to appear as a witness, 73 it must be presumed
that the courts are not convinced that a fair trial requires the testi-
mony and cross-examination of the informer. Thus, the Priestly rule,
in effect, has become a mere procedural stumbling block, of which
the defendant may take advantage in order to defeat an otherwise
successful prosecution.
Section 1042(c) removes the stumbling block of disclosure in
narcotics cases, thus preserving the public interest in protecting in-
formers. Disclosure should not be required when the informer is not
a material witness, provided that the testimony of the officer is suffi-
cient, in the discretion of the trial court, to satisfy the requirements
of probable cause.
The United States Supreme Court, in repeating the holding that
the exclusionary rule will be enforced against the states, has expressly
stated that the states are free to establish their own rules of police
conduct, so long as they are not violative of the Constitution.74
The Supreme Court of California has, itself, noted with favor those
same rules of judicial construction in People v. Mickelson:75
The United States Supreme Court has not interpreted the Fourth
Amendment as requiring that Court to lay down as a matter of con-
stitutional law precise rules of police conduct.... If a state adopts
Prewitt that it could not be presumed that the officer was lying. See note 68, supra
and accompanying text.
71 Cases cited note 59 supra.
72 People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 341 P.2d 1 (1959); Coy v. Superior Court, 51
Cal. 2d 471, 334 P.2d 569 (1959); People v. Wilburn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 702, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1961).
7 3 Cases cited notes 59 and 72 supra.
74 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31-34 (1963). This point is emphasized in People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 440, 282 P.2d 905, 908 (1955).
7559 Cal. 2d 448, 30 Cal. Bptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658 (1963).
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a rule of police conduct consistent with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, and if its officers follow those rules, they do
not act unreasonably within the meaning of the amendment .... 76
In Priestly the court did not say that disclosure was constitutionally
required.77 Therefore, it may be assumed that the legislative abolish-
ment of that rule is not necessarily unconstitutional. The United
States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of disclosure in non-
warrant cases. Although the exclusionary rule is constitutionally re-
quired,78 the methods of establishing probable cause have not been
dictated by the Court. Section 1042(c) of the Evidence Code does
not leave to the prosecution the ultimate decision as to disclosure.
Rather, the judge or magistrate decides whether, under the particular
circumstances of the case, disclosure is required for a fair determina-
tion of the issue of probable cause. Such a procedure would ade-
quately safeguard the defendant's rights and would not be uncon-
stitutional. The result is that a uniform procedure will be followed
in both warrant cases7" and non-warrant cases.
The rules of disclosure for prosecutions for narcotics violations
established by the California Evidence Code provide a workable
solution to the problem of protecting the identity of police informers,
and thereby preserving their future effectiveness, and perhaps their
lives, while at the same time assuring that a fair determination of
probable cause for an arrest or search will be made by a judge or
magistrate. The new rules in no way relax the requirements of legal
searches and seizures.8 0 The law of probable cause remains unchanged.
The effect of the rules will be to avoid, in the future, the impedi-
ments to law enforcement caused by the procedural pitfalls resulting
from the Priestly rule.
76 Id. at 451-52, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 20, 380 P.2d at 660.
7750 Cal. 2d 812, 818, 330 P.2d 39, 43 (1958).
78 Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
79Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See note 44 supra.
8o See notes 41 and 45 supra and accompanying text.
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